We present a protocol enabling two legitimate partners sharing an initial secret to mutually authenticate and to exchange an encryption session key. The opponent is an active Man In The Middle (MITM) with unlimited calculation and storage capacities. The resistance to unlimitedly powered MITM is obtained through the combined use of Deep Random secrecy, formerly introduced [9] and proved as unconditionally secure against passive opponent for key exchange, and universal hash techniques. We prove the resistance to MITM interception attacks, and show that (i) upon successful completion, the protocol leaks no residual information about the current value of the shared secret to the opponent, and (ii) that any unsuccessful completion is detectable by the legitimate partners. We also discuss implementation techniques.
In our model of security, the legitimate partners of the protocol are using Deep Random generation to generate their shared encryption key, and the behavior of the opponent, when inferring from public information, is governed by Deep Random assumption, that we introduce. The legitimate partners have an initial shared authentication secret, that is used only for authentication purpose, not for generating the shared encryption key.
Our protocol is original because it resists to opponents that are both unlimited and active MITM. A scheme like Wigner-Carter Authentication [11] is secure against unlimited opponent but not in a MITM scenario. WCA can however be secure against MITM in the specific case of QKD because of the non-cloning theorem. Public Key schemes can be resistant to MITM opponent but not if they are unlimited. Methods like tamper detection by latency examination [12] are not robust enough and not resistant to unlimited opponents.
Back on the Deep random assumption
We have introduced in [9] the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability theory as developed by Jaynes [7] . Deep Random assumption is an objective principle to assign probability, compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by Jaynes [7] .
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory.
If we denote the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability distribution of a certain random variable ('prior' meaning before having observed any experiment of that variable), and any public information available regarding an experiment of , it is then possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information regarding an experiment of ; we denote this set of possible distributions as:
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable , that do not change the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation of such group, the observer has no information enabling him to privilege ( ) ( | ) rather than ( ) ( ( )| ) as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7] .
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups as the ones fulfilling the 2 conditions below:
( ) Stability -For any distribution , and for any transformation , then ( ) Convexity -Any distribution that is invariant by action of does belong to
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of is exactly:
For any group of transformations applying on the sample space , we denote by ( ) the set of all possible conditional expectations when the distribution of courses ( ). In other words:
Or also:
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if , the strategy of the opponent observer , in order to estimate from the public information , should be chosen by the opponent observer within the restricted set of strategies:
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of to choose his strategy in order estimate the private information from his knowledge of the public information . It is a fully reasonable assumption because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action of a transformation that let the distribution uncertainty unchanged.
( ) suggests of course that should eventually be picked in ⋂ ( ) , but it is enough for our purpose to find at least one group of transformation with which one can apply efficiently the Deep Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an advantage distilled by the legitimate partners compared to the opponent.
Back on the presentation of protocol (introduced in [9])
The following protocol has been presented in [9] . In order to shortly remind the notations, the sample space of the distribution of the private information (for or ) (resp. ) the scalar product of and (resp. and )
represents ( ) for
In that protocol, besides being hidden to any third party (opponent or partner), the probability distribution used by each legitimate partner also needs to have specific properties in order to prevent the opponent to efficiently evaluate by using internal symmetry of the distribution.
Those specific properties are:
(i) Each probability distribution (for or ) must be « far » from its symmetric projection
At least one of the distribution (of or ) must avoid to have brutal variations (Dirac)
The technical details explaining those constraints are presented in [9] . The set of compliant distributions is denoted ( ) where is a parameter that measures the « remoteness » of a distribution from its symmetric projection.
For such a distribution , a tidying permutation, denoted , is a specific permutation that enables to give a canonical form of , such form being useful to « synchronize » two distributions by transitivity. Again, technical details are given in [9] . One can just say here that it is linked to the quadratic matrix whose coefficient is
, by minimizing
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol:
and are the legitimate partners. The steps of the protocol ( ) are the followings:
Step Step 3 -Dispersion: and also pick respectively a second probability distribution and ( ) such that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any observer other than (resp. ).
in order to ensure that | | is not an unlikely value for | | (same for by replacing by and by ). (resp. ) is used to scramble the publication of the tidying permutation of (resp. ). (resp. ) computes a permutation [ ] (resp. [ ]) representing the reverse of the most likely tidying permutation on (resp. ) to produce (resp. ). In other words, with , [ ] realizes :
Then (resp. ) draws a boolean { } (resp. ) and publishes in a random order ( )
) where represents the transposition of elements in a couple.
Step 4 -Synchronization:
(resp. ) chooses randomly (resp. ) among ( ) (resp. ( )).
Step [4] .
The choices of the parameters ( ) are theoretically discussed in proof of main Theorem in [9] . They are set to make steps 5, 5' and 6 possible.
The Degradation transformations and with at step 2 are the ones that prevent the use of direct inference by the opponent, and of course, the Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents the use of Bayesian inference based on the knowledge of the probability distribution. The synchronization step 4 is designed to overcome the independence between the choices of the distributions of and , and needs that the distributions to have special properties ( ( )) in order to efficiently play their role. It is efficient in ⁄ of cases (when picks and picks , which we will call favorable cases). And to prevent from gaining knowledge of , Dispersion step 3 mixes within ( ) with another permutation [ ] (and within ( ) with another permutation [ ]) that (1) is undistinguishable from knowing , and (2) manages to make the estimation of unefficient as shown in [9] . We denote the following set of strategies (invariant by transposition of ( ) or ( )):
Because of Deep Random assumption ( ) over the group { } applied to the distribution of ( ) and ( ), the strategy of the opponent can thus be restricted to .
is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the constraint and transformation applied on in step 3 to make
and [ ] indisguishable knowing (same with [ ], , and ).
The synchronization step has a cost when considering the favorable cases: knows that and are synchronized in favorable cases, which means in other words that knows that an optimal (or quasi optimal) permutation is applied to . This also means that in favorable cases, all happen like if when picks instead of , the result of the synchronization is that uses instead of .
Starting from the most general strategy for , we also consider the following additional restrictions applicable to the favorable cases:
 Restriction to the strategies of the form ( ), because ( [ ] [ ]) depends only on ( ) and not on neither ,  And then restriction to the set of strategies such that
, in other words strategies invariant by common permutation on . which leads to define the more restricted set of strategies:
The step 5 is called Decorrelation because at this step, thanks to the Deep Random Assumption, we have managed to create a protocol that can be equivalently modelized by a broadcast communication over 2 partially independent (not fully correlated) BSC, as shown in the main Theorem in [9] , and also that consequently, it is possible to apply error correcting techniques to create Advantage Distillation as established in [5] .
We This is a heuristic reasoning, and we must rather consider most general strategies ( ) and write the probability equations with the appropriate group transform, under Deep Random assumption, which is done in [9] . But this little array explains why we create partial independence between the BSC and consequently then an advantage for the legitimate partners compared to the opponent, bearing in mind that ( ) (resp. ( )) are absolutely undistinguishable knowing (resp. ), due to the fact that the distributions and (resp. and ) are unknown and thus also absolutely undistinguishable by .
The sampling method presented above has the drawback of the border effect. If the reference value is too close from one of the sampling frontier { √ } , then the sampling process becomes unefficient. In order to avoid the border effect, one can bring a little improvement to the protocol by allowing to publish :
and then to replace by √ in order to center within the sampling comb. This of course results in applying the same transform on and : 
II. Extended protocol against active opponent
The protocol introduced in [9] and summarized in the former section is suitable to generate a common secret bit string between the legitimate partners against a passive unlimited opponent. The parameters of can be adapted so that,
In order to generate , the partners will execute a sequence of rounds of that can be serialized as follows:
The purpose of generating is of course to transmit a secret message from to . The encryption function ( ) can be simply if one want the highest security offered by one time pad, or another symmetric key encryption scheme working with a shared secret key . While we have shown that a passive opponent cannot gain knowledge of , it is obvious that an active opponent can insert himself in the communication, first playing the role of with , which enables him to collect , and then, optionally, to play the role of with to transmit , or even a different message to .
We will see now how to prevent this MITM attack with an extended version of the protocol .
The security model
In our 'active opponent scenario', still has unlimited computation and storage power, but is also capable to (i) delete messages from the public channel, (ii) introduce new messages in the public channel at destination of either or ; (i)+(ii) is also equivalent to the capacity to modify a message transiting from to or from to .
and are equipped with a DRG, and also with a private 'wallet' that can contain a shared authentication secret , that can be updated at any time by the wallet holder. It is assumed as a precondition to the protocol that and have initially the same value in their wallet.
It is assumed that the opponent has no access to (i) the content of a private wallet, (ii) anything computed or stored within a DRG.
The goal of the extended protocol is to continue to ensure that,
even with such an active opponent.
Description of the extended protocol
The extended protocol that we propose is possible only because of a specific non-reversibility property of . Indeed it is shown in [9] (Lemma3) that, when the public information ( ) is given, with the assumption that the distributions are synchronized, then it is impossible to reversely determine or with an accuracy equal to the one of a partner's estimation. is original because, unlike any other protocol that does not benefit from the non-reversibility property of Deep Random Secrecy, it resists to opponents that are both unlimited and active MITM.
The extension then consists in adding a mutual verification phase after the bit string has been generated, and before transmitting the secret message . This verification is performed by:
(i) dividing the shared secret into 2 independent piece ( ) (with ( ) ( ) ( ) ⁄ ) (ii) sending from to (resp. to ) a verification code ( { ( ) } { ( ) } ) (resp.) ( { ( ) } { ( ) } ) (the characteristics of the verification function will be discussed hereafter) (iii)
verifying by (resp. by ) that the local computation
using part of the entropy of to renew (sending ( )) a new value of the shared authentication secret for a next round (v) storing by (resp. ) the new value of shared authentication secret in its private wallet.
Assuming that ( ) , having a length bounded at each round by | | , the common shared bit string must have length:
in order to be able to fully renew the shared authentication secret after each round.
Design considerations for security
The verification function must have at least the following characteristics:
if { ( ) } { ( ) } are known, and
Due to the non-reversibility property of , it is not possible for to keep ( ) (resp. ( ) ) unchanged when transmitting towards (resp. ) because then it is impossible to generate and (resp. and ) that would enable to play the role of vis à vis (resp. vis à vis ) in determining with unchanged transmitted public information ( ) and ( ) . Therefore, has no other choice than to execute fairly with both and in order to share a secret with either of them. can try to adjust the value of a guessed shared authentication secret, but due to the fact that there exists many possible values of such that
and
it is not possible for to guarantee that
for all .
One may question if it is possible for to learn at least some bits of . If is not carefully designed, here is how can learn even almost all bits of . Assume for example that we choose:
can then sacrifice the last instance ( ) to control that without knowing , by resolving the equations:
The interaction flows perform as follows:
By proceeding as described above, can gain the amount of knowledge of given by performing correctly all instances except the last one, which will give
This attack is made possible because of the existence of transformation over { ( ) } and/or { ( ) } that can let invariant independently of . The design of should then guarantee:
There does not exist any non-trivial transformation applying on the space { ( ) ( ) } such that
We propose to use:
where is a prime superior to ( ) , and { } are random nonzero integers, fixed as parameters of the protocol (not negotiated); they can typically be the successive outputs of a congruential generator to avoid to store all them in memory. The permutation is written above with its canonical binary form to be able to compute it with arithmetic.
̅ is a nonlinear form on also involving for each . { ( )} is a well known universal hashing class of functions, thus benefiting from the good probabilistic properties of such class.
The modularity structure of in terms of using blocks of the form ( ( ̅)) and composing them by simple is chosen on purpose; in case public information { ( ) } are reused from a round to another, the associated block can be reused without re-computation of the arithmetical operations. This reuse technique will be illustrated in optimization techniques for , presented in further work.
Other considerations
Eventually, note that the computation of is obviously highly sensitive to errors in the transmission of the { ( ) ( ) } , and therefore it is recommended to associate each { ( ) } with an error control checksum.
The size parameters ( ) should also be fixed as parameters of the protocol and not negotiated, in order to avoid that they become also vulnerable to MITM attacks.
III. Conclusion
We have proposed an authentication scheme resisting to unlimited MITM attackers. This scheme is working in conjunction with a key exchange protocol and is only made possible by the very special non-reversibility property of Deep Random Secrecy. The scheme requires a prior shared authentication secret that is kept fully independent from the shared encryption key generated between the partners as the output of the protocol. The shared authentication secret has to be renewed after each round of the protocol for a full secrecy against unlimited opponent, and the renewal process is part of the protocol.
This protocol is then suitable to replace protocols like TLS in scenarios where opponents are assumed unlimited (typically because equipped with quantum computers), but requires a prior registration phase between the partners to initialize the shared authentication secret. Such registration is quite realistic in practice (think about creating an online account for instance). However, one could question the poor level of performance (bandwidth, CPU) of the protocol to replace a popular protocol like TLS.
The main performance concern is of course the quantity of information needed to generate an output shared key . That quantity is superior to | | (where is a constant depending on IRPA method used in ). In general, such a key exchange protocol based on Deep Random Secrecy and resistant to unlimited MITM cannot exceed a bandwidth performance of | | ⁄ , where is the Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9] . The question of optimization of (and ) in terms of getting close to will be addressed in further work.
The CPU performance question can be addressed by searching fastest possible functions that verifies properties 1, 2 and 3. It can also be questioned if one can lower the requirement of Property 3 together with maintaining the security model; Property seems too much demanding at first sight compared to the objective because many transformations could be harmless to the protocol.
